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I. INTRODUCTION
In June 2008, the Supreme Court of the United States decided
Boumediene v. Bush,' giving alien terrorist suspects detained at
Guantanamo Bay the constitutional right to seek habeas corpuS2
relief in federal courts.3 Zigzagging its way through a millennium
of legal history and precedent to the contrary, the Court held that
its jurisdiction to issue the writ of habeas corpus could reach out-
side the sovereign territory of the United States and that the Con-
stitution compelled the writ's extension to Guantanamo detain-
ees.4 In arriving at this conclusion, the Court fashioned a three-
part balancing test to determine under what circumstances the
writ would reach outside the United States.5 With this balancing
test, the Boumediene Court bequeathed a blank check to the lower
courts to extend the writ beyond Guantanamo to "the four corners
1. 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008).
2. Habeas corpus is "[a] writ employed to bring a person before a court, most fre-
quently to ensure that the person's imprisonment or detention is not illegal." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 778 (9th ed. 2009). The writ of habeas corpus is protected by the Suspension
Clause of the United States Constitution, which provides: "The Privilege of the Writ of
Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the
public Safety may require it." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
3. Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2262 (2008).
4. See James Thornburg, Recent Decision, Aliens Detained at Guantanamo Bay Have
a Constitutional Right to File Habeas Corpus Petitions in Federal Court: Boumediene v.
Bush, 47 DUQ. L. REV. 179 (2009).
5. See Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2259.
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of the earth."16 In April 2009, with his decision in Al Maqaleh v.
Gates,7 Judge John D. Bates8 cashed that check and bought a
ticket to Bagram Airfield in Afghanistan, an active theater of war.
With his extension of the writ to enemy combatants detained in
Afghanistan, Judge Bates demonstrated the utter manipulability
of the Boismediene test and revealed the extent to which the
Boumediene Court's ill-considered decision subjects our nation's
warfighting ability to the whims of life-tenured, unelected, politi-
cally unaccountable lawyers in black robes.
This comment will examine Judge Bates's application of Bourn-
ediene in Maqaleh. First, it will provide a brief overview of the
creation of the balancing test in Boumediene and its application in
Maqaleh. Next, the comment will analyze Judge Bates's applica-
tion of the test, arguing that he misunderstood or improperly
weighed relevant factors and relied on considerations never men-
tioned by the Boumediene Court. Finally, the comment will main-
tain that Judge Bates's misadventure confirms that Bournediene
created a poor framework for determining the extraterritorial
reach of the writ of habeas corpus.
11. BACKGROUND
A. The Boumediene Test
The Boumediene Court identified three factors relevant to de-
termining whether the writ of habeas corpus extends to detainees
outside the sovereign territory of the United States: "(1) the citi-
zenship and status of the detainee and the adequacy of the process
through which that status determination was made; (2) the nature
of the sites where apprehension and then detention took place;
and (3) the practical obstacles inherent in resolving the prisoner's
entitlement to the writ." In applying these factors, the Court of-
ten compared the situation of the Guantanamo detainees to that of
6. Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 498 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting that aban-
donment of territorial sovereignty as the test for the reach of the writ will result in habeas
jurisdiction without limits), superseded by statute, Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L.
No. 109-148, § 1005, 119 Stat. 2680, 2740-44 (amending 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (2006)) and Mili-
tary Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, § 7, 120 Stat. 2600, 2635-36 (amending
28 U.S.C. § 2241 (2006)).
7. 604 F. Supp. 2d 205 (D.D.C. 2009).
8. Judge Bates was appointed to the United States District Court for the District of
Columbia by President George W. Bush in December 2001. Judge John D. Bates,
http://www.dcd.uscourts.gov/bates-bio.html (last visited Jan. 13, 2010).
9. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2259.
86 Vol. 48
Winter 2010 Habeas Corpus Jurisdiction 87
the German detainees in Johnson v. Eisentrager,O a 1950 case in
which the Court held that the writ did not extend to enemy aliens
convicted of violating the laws of war and detained by American
forces at Landsberg Prison during the Allied Powers' occupation of
Germany after the Second World War." The Boumediene Court
distinguished Eisentrager and held that, though the writ did not
extend to the Eisentrager detainees, it could extend to the Guan-
tanamo detainees.' 2 This distinction would later become critical
in Maqaleh, as the dividing line for whether the writ extended in a
given case must lay somewhere between the situations presented
in Boumediene and Eisentrager.
Applying the first factor of its test, the Boumediene Court found:
(1) that the detainees were not American citizens; (2) that their
status was in dispute because they denied that they were enemy
combatants; and (3) that the process through which their status
determination was made was inadequate. 13 The Court noted that
the Eisentrager detainees also were not American citizens, but
that they apparently had not contested their status as enemy
aliens.' 4 The legal process for determining that status in Eisen-
trager, the Boumediene Court pointed out, was much more exten-
sive than the process received by the Guantanamo detainees.' 5
While the Eisentrager detainees underwent "a rigorous adversar-
ial process to test the legality of their detention," the Guantanamo
detainees received procedural protections that "f[e]ll well short of
the procedures and adversarial mechanisms that would eliminate
the need for habeas corpus review."' 6
The Boumediene Court conceded that the detainees failed to
meet the second factor of the test because the sites of their appre-
hension and detention were "technically outside the sovereign ter-
ritory of the United States," and that this factor thus "weigh[ed]
against finding" that the writ extended to the detainees.' 7 How-
ever, the Court implied that the site of detention had weighed
more heavily against the Eisentrager detainees, as the United
States' control over Guantanamo was "absolute and indefinite,"
but its control over Landsberg Prison in Germany had been "tran-
10. 339 U.S. 763 (1950).
11. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 765-66.
12. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2259-62.
13. Id. at 2259-60.
14. Id. at 2259.
15. Id. at 2259-60.
16. Id.
17. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2260.
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sient" and the United States had been "answerable to its Allies for
all activities occurring there."' 8 The Boumediene Court concluded
that the United States had de facto sovereignty over Guantanamo
and that "[iln every practical sense Guantanamo is not abroad; it
is within the constant jurisdiction of the United States."' 9
For the third factor, the Boumediene Court found "few" practical
obstacles and noted that the "Government present[ed] no credible
arguments that the military mission at Guantanamo would be
compromised if habeas corpus courts had jurisdiction to hear the
detainees' claims." 20 The Court contrasted this lack of practical
obstacles with what it saw as substantial practical obstacles exist-
ing in Eisentrager.2 1 It pointed out that American forces in post-
war Germany were "responsible for an occupation zone encom-
passing over 57,000 square miles with a population of 18 million,"
supervised "massive reconstruction and aid efforts," and "faced
potential security threats."22 The Boumediene Court also stated
that the Eisentrager Court "was right to be concerned about judi-
cial interference with the military's efforts to contain enemy ele-
ments, guerilla fighters, and 'were-wolves." 23 Such obstacles did
not exist at Guantanamo, the Boismediene Court reasoned, as it
was an isolated area of only forty-five square miles occupied exclu-
sively by U.S. personnel, the detainees, and "a small number of
workers."124 The Court also stated that if Guantanamo "were lo-
cated in an active theater of war, arguments that issuing the writ
would be 'impracticable or anomalous' would have more weight."25
After analyzing each of the three factors, the Boumediene Court
proceeded to hold that the writ extended to the Guantanamo de-
tainees.26  Though the majority opinion totaled almost forty
pages,27 only about three were devoted to the formulation and ap-
plication of the test.28 The Boumediene Court's brief analysis of
18. Id. at 2260-61.
19. Id. at 2261.
20. Id. at 2261-62. it seems, however, that the Government did not attempt to argue
that any practical obstacles would prevent the writ's extension to Guantanamo, ostensibly
because nothing in the history or precedent existing before Boumediene indicated that such
a factor would be relevant. See Brief for the Respondents, Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct.
2229 (2008) (Nos. 06-1195 and 06-1196), 2007 WL 2972541.




25. Id. at 2261.62.
26. Boumediene, 128 S. ct. at 2262.
27. See id. at 2240.77.
28. See id. at 2259-62.
Vol. 4888
Winter 2010 Habeas Corpus Jurisdiction 89
the test it created would provide little guidance to those applying
it in future cases. The Court did not explain how it weighed the
factors against each other or which factors it considered most im-
portant. Though it stated that "there are few practical barriers to
the running of the writ," it did not identify any such barriers, us-
ing its analysis only to point out practical barriers from Eisen-
trager that did not exist at Guantanamo. 29 Though it concluded
that "[iln every practical sense Guantanamo is not abroad ," it did
not state whether that finding was essential to the extension of
the writ.30
A nebulous gray area lay between the situations that existed in
Boumediene and Eisentrager. On one end of the spectrum, the
writ of habeas corpus could extend outside the sovereign territory
of the United States; on the other end, it could not. Into this gray
area fell Maqaleh.
B. The Test's Application in Maqaleh
In Maqaleh, the District Court for the District of Columbia was
confronted with the task of applying the Boumediene test to de-
termine whether the writ could extend to detainees held at Ba-
gram Airfield, a U.S. military base in Afghanistan.3 ' The petition-
ers were four detainees captured outside Afghanistan and later
moved to Bagram. 32 They were designated "enemy combatants"
by the United States and held for over six years. 33 Each petitioner
had filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, and the Govern-
ment filed motions to dismiss the petitions for lack of jurisdic-
tion.34 The resolution of these motions was the subject of the
29. Id. at 2262.
30. Id. at 2261.
31. Maqaleh, 604 F. Supp. 2d at 207.
32. Id. at 209. The four petitioners were: Fadi al Maqaleh, a Yemeni citizen captured
at an unspecified location outside Afghanistan; Amin al Bakri, a Yemeni citizen captured in
Thailand; Redha al-Najar, a Tunisian citizen captured in Pakistan; and Haji Wazir, an
Afghan citizen captured in the United Arab Emirates. Id.
33. Id. Judge Bates quoted the Government's description of the definition of enemy
combatants:
At a minimum, the President's power to detain includes the ability to detain as en-
emy combatants those individuals who were part of, or supporting, forces engaged in
hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners and allies. This in-
cludes individuals who were part of or directly supporting Taliban, al-Qaida, or asso-
ciated forces, that are engaged in hostilities against the United States, its coalition
partners or allies. This also includes any persons who have committed a belligerent
act or supported hostilities in aid of enemy forces.
Id. at 219.
34. Id. at 209-210.
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Maqaleh decision, requiring Judge Bates to determine whether his
court had jurisdiction to issue the writ of habeas corpus to these
petitioners held in Afghanistan. 35
Noting that the case presented the same constitutional question
as Boumediene, Judge Bates began by recognizing that his analy-
sis must focus on the "specific framework" fashioned by the Bourn-
ediene Court.36 Turning to the three-part Boumediene test, he
subdivided the three factors, "for the sake of analysis," into six:
(1) the citizenship of the detainee; (2) the status of the de-
tainee; (3) the adequacy of the process through which the
status determination was made; (4) the nature of the site of
apprehension; (5) the nature of the site of detention; and (6)
the practical obstacles inherent in resolving the petitioner's
entitlement to the writ.37
Judge Bates also noted a seventh factor that "tacitly informed" the
Bournediene Court's decision-"the length of a petitioner's deten-
tion without adequate review."38 Applying these seven factors,
Judge Bates concluded that: (1) the detainees were not U.S. citi-
zens;39 (2) the detainees' status as enemy combatants was in dis-
pute;40 (3) the process through which the detainees' status was
determined was inadequate and was even less than the process
received by the Bournediene petitioners;4 ' (4) the detainees were
apprehended outside of U.S. territory;42 (5) the United States ex-
ercised slightly less control over Bagram than it did over Guan-
tanamo;43 (6) the practical obstacles inherent in extending the writ
to the detainees were somewhat greater than those that existed
for the Boumediene petitioners;44 and (7) the detainees had been
held for over six years without adequate review, an unreasonable
length of time.45
There were no appreciable differences between the Maqaleh and
Boumediene petitioners with respect to the first, second, and sev-
35. Id. at 210.
36. Mczqaleh, 604 F. Supp. 2d at 214.
37. Id. at 215.
38. Id. at 216.
39. Id. at 218-19.
40. Id. at 219.
41. Moaqaleh, 604 F. Supp. 2d at 226-27.
42. Id. at 220.22.
43. Id. at 221-26.
44. Id. at 227-31.
45. Id. at 216-17.
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enth factors, the court held.46 In Judge Bates's estimation, the
third factor favored the Maqaleh petitioners to a greater degree
than it had favored the Boumediene petitioners, while the fifth
and sixth factors were slightly less favorable. His analysis of the
fourth factor-the site of apprehension-was somewhat inconsis-
tent, making it difficult to discern exactly how the factor was ul-
timately weighed. Balancing these factors, Judge Bates held that
three of the four detainees passed the Boumediene test and would
have access to the writ. In the case of the Haji Wazir, the only
detainee who was an Afghan citizen, he held that potential friction
with the Afghan government was a practical obstacle that tipped
the scale against giving Wazir access to the writ.
II. ANALYSIS
Judge Bates's application of the Boumediene test contained
many serious errors. On multiple occasions, he failed to take into
account important considerations addressed by the Boumediene
Court, misinterpreted the Boumediene Court's analysis, and
delved into issues that were not considered in Boumediene (and
therefore irrelevant to the application of the Boumediene test).
The errors lay primarily in his application of the site of apprehen-
sion, site of detention, and practical obstacles factors.47 As the
following analysis will show, had those factors been properly ap-
plied, the opposite result would have been reached, and the writ of
habeas corpus would not have been extended to the Bagram de-
tainees.
A. Site of Apprehension
Judge Bates's consideration of the site of apprehension factor
was troublingly inconsistent and deviated sharply from the guid-
ance provided by Boumediene. Apparently not noticing his self-
contradiction, Judge Bates flip-flopped on the weight of the factor
twice in the space of two pages, saying first that it cut against the
detainees, then that it cut in their favor, and again that it cut
against them.48 He claimed that the factor was unimportant to
46. Maqaleh, 604 F. Supp. 2d at 217-18.
47. See id. at 220-31. There were no major problems with Judge Bates's application of
the citizenship, status, adequacy of process, or length of detention factors. See id. at 216-
20, 226-27.
48. See id. at 220-21. "Here, as in Boumediene, all petitioners were captured outside
the United States, and hence the site of apprehension 'is a factor that weighs against a
Winter 2010 1
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the Boismediene Court but asserted that it was more important in
Maqaleh, even though the situation of the detainees in each case
could not be "materially distinguished."49 He used a rationale
never mentioned in Boumediene-even though it would have ap-
plied with equal force in that case had it been a relevant consid-
eration-and his application of that rationale was absurdly mis-
guided. This inexplicable departure from Boumediene represents
Judge Bates's most serious error in Maqaleh.
The site of apprehension factor was relevant in Boumediene for
only one reason: the Guantanamo detainees were apprehended
outside of the United States, and therefore the factor cut against
them.5 0 Judge Bates noted as much and stated that the factor cut
against the Bagram detainees, 51 but then proceeded on a puzzling
course of analysis that had absolutely no basis in Boumediene or
any other precedent. Though he had up to this point assigned to
each factor the same weight he believed the Boumediene Court
had assigned to it, Judge Bates claimed that "[tlhe site of appre-
hension factor . .. is of more importance here than it was for the
Guantanamo detainees in Boumediene, and for these petitioners
cuts in their favor because . .. all were apprehended outside of Af-
ghanistan."52 Judge Bates's concern was "that the Executive could
move detainees physically beyond the reach of the Constitution
and detain them indefinitely."5
However, the situation Judge Bates was concerned with did not
exist in Maqaleh. Even though the Bagram detainees had been
captured outside of Afghanistan and moved there, the Executive
had not moved them "beyond the reach of the Constitution." They
had never been within reach of the Constitution in the first place.
Judge Bates's concern would perhaps have some merit if the Ex-
ecutive had moved the detainees from locations inside the United
States (where the writ was available) to some foreign country in
an attempt to take them out of judicial reach. But the Bagram
finding that they have rights under the Suspension Clause."' Id. at 220 (quoting Boumedi-
ene, 128 S. Ct. at 2261). "The site of apprehension factor, therefore, is of more importance
here than it was for the Guantanamo detainees in Boumediene, and for these petitioners,
cuts in their favor because . .. all were apprehended outside of Afghanistan." Id. at 221.
"None [of the detainees] are U.S. citizens or were apprehended in U.S. territory, so these
factors cut against them." Id.
49. Id. at 221.
50. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2260.
51. Maqaleh, 604 F. Supp. 2d at 220.
52. Id. at 221 (emphasis added).
53. Id. at 220.
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detainees were never in a place where the writ could extend.54 The
Executive simply captured them in one foreign country where the
writ could not extend and moved them to another foreign country
where the writ could not (until now) extend. Barring an assertion
that the Executive has a duty to transport into the United States
all enemy combatants captured abroad (an assertion no one
made), it cannot be argued that the Executive handled the detain-
ees in a way that deprived them of any rights they would other-
wise have had. Thus, Judge Bates's implication that the Execu-
tive was squirreling the detainees away to some backwater to
avoid having to respect their alleged rights is devoid of merit.55
Judge Bates's attempt to employ Boitmediene to bolster this ra-
tionale was similarly misguided, particularly where he quoted the
Boumnediene Court's pronouncement that "[o]ur basic charter can-
not be contracted away like this."5 6 His use of this blunt assertion
is rendered nonsensical by the fact that he took the statement en-
tirely out of context. Properly understood, this statement by the
Boumediene Court would have no application to Judge Bates's site
of apprehension analysis. When considering the effect of territo-
rial sovereignty on the reach of the writ, the Boumediene Court
noted that, immediately following the Spanish-American War, the
United States acquired Cuba from Spain and governed it in trust
for the Cuban people. 57 Several years later, the United States
transferred sovereignty back to Cuba, but at the same time en-
tered into a lease agreement to maintain control over Guan-
tanamo. 58 The lease provided that, while Cuba would technically
retain "ultimate sovereignty" over Guantanamo, the United States
would have plenary control.59 The statement about how the Ex-
ecutive "contracted away" the Constitution referred specifically to
this arrangement, where the United States had once had sover-
eignty over Guantanamo (such that the writ would extend there)
and had entered into a contract (the lease) whereby de jure sover-
eignty was handed over but nothing else changed. The Boumedi-
ene Court criticized the Government's characterization of this ar-
54. See id. at 209.
55. See id. at 220. Judge Bates's implication of impropriety in the Executive's moving
the detainees away from their places of capture to Afghanistan was unaccompanied by any
indication that the United States had any means of holding the detainees in their places of
capture. See jd.
56. Maqaleh, 604 F. Supp. 2d at 220 (quoting Boumediene, 128 S. ct. at 2259).
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rangement as part of its rejection of the argument that the reach
of the writ depended solely on de jure sovereignty over the site of
detention.60 The statement dealt solely with issues of sovereignty,
referenced an actual contract, and had nothing to do with rendi-
tion of detainees or the site of apprehension. Thus, Judge Bates's
use of the "contracted away" quotation was completely misplaced
and seems to have been merely an attempt to grandiosely de-
nounce the Executive's actions.
In the same vein, Judge Bates also commented ominously that
"rendition resurrects the same specter of limitless Executive
power the Supreme Court sought to guard against in Boumedi-
ene."61 Yet, had the Boismediene Court been at all concerned about
rendition, one might have expected it to at least mention the con-
cept somewhere in its lengthy opinion. What is most striking
about the untenable position staked out by Judge Bates was that
he reached his conclusion with absolutely no guidance from Bourn-
ediene. He admitted that the Guantanamo detainees were in the
same position as the Bagram detainees: the Guantanamo detain-
ees had all been captured outside of Cuba and "rendered" there,
while the Bagram detainees had all been captured outside of Af-
ghanistan and "rendered" there.62 The Bournediene Court, how-
ever, never mentioned rendition and certainly never considered it
as part of its balancing test analysis. The fact that the Guan-
tanamo detainees had been rendered to Cuba played no role what-
soever in the Boumediene Court's consideration of the site of ap-
prehension factor, and thus should have played no role in
Maqaleh. It is almost incomprehensible that Judge Bates would
not only take it upon himself to invent this consideration without
guidance from Boumediene, but would also state that it favored
the Bagram detainees more than the Guantanamo detainees,
when the two groups were admittedly in the same position.
60. Id. The Boumediene Court stated:
The necessary implication of the argument is that by surrendering formal sover-
eignty over any unincorporated territory to a third party, while at the same time en-
tering into a lease that grants total control over the territory back to the United
States, it would be possible for the political branches to govern without legal con-
straint.
Id. at 2258-59.
61. Maqaleh, 604 F. Supp. 2d at 220.
62. Id. To the extent that Eisentrager may also be relevant here, it should be noted
that the German detainees in that case had been captured in China, convicted by a military
commission in China for engaging in hostile acts against the United States after Germany
had surrendered, and repatriated to Germany to serve their sentences. Eisentrager, 339
U.S. at 765-66. The fact that they had been moved from China to Germany played no role
in the Court's analysis.
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Under a proper reading of Boumediene, the site of apprehension
factor would cut against the Bagram detainees just as it had the
Guantanamo detainees simply because they were captured outside
of the Unites States. Judge Bates did say this-twice, in fact-but
he also declared that the factor cut in the detainees' favor.63
Though it may be impossible to discern exactly what he held be-
cause he repeatedly contradicted himself, it is clear that Judge
Bates did not adopt the simple, correct holding that the site of ap-
prehension factor cut against the detainees because they were
captured outside the United States. His otherwise pointless de-
viation from Boitmediene was undoubtedly an indication that he
weighed the factor in favor of the detainees, albeit without any
supporting authority. With this shift in weight from Boumediene
to Maqaleh, the factor must be considered a major reason why the
Bagram detainees' case was able to make up for the points it
would lose on the site of detention and practical obstacles factors.
Thus, Judge Bates's unfounded preoccupation with rendition just
may have been the thumb on the scale that tipped the final bal-
ance to the detainees.
B. Site of Detention
Judge Bates's consideration of the site of detention factor was
founded on a fundamental misunderstanding of the Boumediene
Court's analysis. He stated that, "[w]hereas the site of detention
factor in Boumediene plainly supported application of the Suspen-
sion Clause64 (and hence habeas rights), it does not favor petition-
ers to quite the same extent here."65 However, the Boumnediene
Court did not hold that the site of detention favored the Guan-
tanamo detainees. To the contrary, it plainly stated that the fac-
tor weighed against extending the writ.66 Judge Bates's misun-
derstanding of this point was evident from an earlier statement he
made describing the cursory analysis the Boumediene Court gave
the site of apprehension factor, where he asserted that the Bourn-
ediene Court simply recognized that the factor weighed against
the detainees and "immediately moved on to a different factor-
the site of detention.167 For the Bournediene Court, however, the
sites of apprehension and detention were lumped together in one
63. See Maqaleh, 604 F. Supp. 2d at 220-21.
64. See supra note 2.
65. Maqaleh, 604 F. Supp. 2d at 225-26.
66. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2260.
67. Maqaleh, 604 F. Supp. 2d at 218.
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factor, and its conclusion that that factor cut against the detainees
clearly applied to both:
As to the second factor relevant to this analysis, the detainees
are similarly situated to the Eisentrager petitioners in that
the sites of apprehension and detention are technically out-
side the sovereign territory of the United States. As noted
earlier, this is a factor that weighs against finding they have
rights under the Suspension Clause.68
As is evident from this statement, the site of detention (like the
site of apprehension) favors extension only where it is within the
sovereign territory of the United States. The Boutmediene Court
struggled mightily throughout the first half of its opinion to dis-
count the Government's strong argument that, historically, terri-
torial sovereignty over the site of detention was the only factor in
determining the reach of the writ.69 While it managed to stake out
a position in which a lack of territorial sovereignty over the site of
detention may not in itself be fatal to the extension of the writ, the
Boumediene Court certainly never went so far as to assert that a
site of detention outside of the sovereign territory of the United
States could actually favor extension.
The Boumediene Court, after noting that the site of detention
factor cut against the detainees, went on to discuss how the
United States had much greater control over the site of detention
at Guantanamo than it had had in Eisentrager.70 This discussion
can only be understood as an attempt to maintain that, though the
site of detention may not have favored extension of the writ, it was
not fatal to it. That Judge Bates did not understand this basic
point indicates that his weighing of this factor was badly skewed.
The lesser degree of control the United States had over Bagram
(as compared to Guantanamo) 71 did not make a good factor
slightly less good-it made an already bad factor worse.
68. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2260 (emphasis added).
69. See id. at 2248-59.
70. Id. at 2260.
71. See Maqaleh, 604 F. Supp. 2d at 224-26. "United States control and jurisdiction at
Bagram is slightly less complete than at Guantanamo." Id. at 224. "[Alithough Bagramn
does not align squarely with either Landsberg or Guantanamo, this Court cannot conclude
that Bagram, like Guantanamo, is 'not abroad.' W~hereas the site of detention factor in
Boismediene plainly supported application of the Suspension Clause (and hence habeas
rights) to the Guantanamo detainees, it does not favor petitioners to quite the same extent
here." Id. at 225-26.
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The Boumediene Court spent only one paragraph analyzing the
site of detention factor.72 If Judge Bates misread the beginning of
that paragraph by not understanding that the Boumediene Court
held the factor cut against the detainees, he skimmed the end of
it, failing to address one of the few things considered by the
Boumediene Court in its short analysis. In its comparison of
Guantanamo with Landsberg Prison, the Boumediene Court
pointed out that both Boumediene and Eisentrager were consistent
with the Insular Cases.73 The Insular Cases were a series of Su-
preme Court cases involving the application of various constitu-
tional provisions to territories, such as Puerto Rico and Hawaii,
acquired by the United States around the turn of the century.74
The Boumediene Court understood the Insular Cases to hold that
"there was no need to extend full constitutional protections to ter-
ritories the United States did not intend to govern indefinitely."75
Because the United States did not plan a long-term occupation of
Germany, the Eisentrager Court's refusal to extend the writ there
was consistent with the Insular Cases.76 So too was the Boumedi-
ene Court's extension of the writ-the United States had occupied
Guantanamo for over 100 years and had no plans to leave, thus
making the extension of constitutional protections like habeas
corpus necessary.77 The Boumediene Court pointed out this com-
pliance with the Insular Cases as part of its analysis of the site of
detention factor.78 Although Judge Bates admitted that, because
the United States did not intend to occupy Afghanistan indefi-
nitely, Maqaleh was similar to Eisentrager and different from
Boumediene,79 he did not mention the Insular Cases. But the In-
sular Cases were clearly a consideration for the Boumediene
Court, and Maqaleh clearly fell on the Eisentrager side of that
analysis, such that there would be "no need to extend full constitu-
tional protections" to Afghanistan. Given that the Boumediene
72. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2260-61.
73. Id.
74. See De Lima v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 1 (1901); Dooley v. United States, 182 U.S. 222
(1901); Armstrong v. United States, 182 U.S. 243 (1901); Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244
(1901); Hawaii v. Mankichi, 190 U.S. 197 (1903); Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 138 (1904)
75. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2260-61. Though the correctness of the Boumediene
Court's interpretation of the Insular Cases is suspect-as Justice Scalia pointed out in his





79. Maqaleh, 604 F. Supp. 2d at 224-25.
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Court only considered a few things in the single paragraph it de-
voted to the site of detention factor, it was irresponsible for Judge
Bates to fail to address the Insular Cases issue. More seriously, it
was error to decide Maqaleh against the Boumediene Court's read-
ing of the Insular Cases. Eisentrager and Boumediene were con-
sistent with the Insular Cases, but Judge Bates's decision to ex-
tend the writ to Afghanistan was not.
C. Practical Obstacles
In its analysis of the practical obstacles factor, the Boumediene
Court found practical obstacles inherent in the large-scale, dan-
gerous mission American forces faced in Eisentrager, indicating
that massive responsibilities and potential security threats cut
against extension of the writ.80 A similar situation was presented
in Maqaleh,81 but Judge Bates failed to appreciate how closely the
practical obstacles in Maqaleh resembled those in Eisentrager.
The Boumediene Court found that practical obstacles were
greater in Eisentrager in part because the United States had been
"4responsible for an occupation zone encompassing over 57,000
square miles with a population of 18 million."8 2 Judge Bates
should have noted that Afghanistan is an occupation zone encom-
passing about 250,000 square miles with a population over 30 mil-
lion,83 making it substantially more unfavorable to the detainees
in this respect than the Eisentrager situation was. The Boumedi-
ene Court noted that, in Eisentrager, American forces had been
charged with "supervising massive reconstruction and aid ef-
forts.18 4 Judge Bates should have noted that American forces in
Afghanistan have similarly been charged with a massive nation-
building mission.85 The Boumediene Court maintained that the
80. See Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2261-62.
81. See Maqaieh, 604 F. Supp. 2d at 227-31.
82. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2261.
83. See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, BACKGROUND NOTE: AFGHANISTAN (2008),
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5380.htm (last visited Jan. 13, 2010).
84. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2261.
85. See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, SECURING AFGHANISTAN: STABILIZATION &
GROWTH (2007), http://www.defenselink.mil/home/features/2007/Afgbanistan/ (last visited Jan. 13,
2010). The Department of Defense described the U.S. mission in Afghanistan:
In response to the events of September 11, 2001, the U.S. and its allies launched an
invasion of Afghanistan to overthrow the Taliban regime and destroy the al-Qaeda
terrorist network it supported. In the years since, the International Security Assis-
tance Force, under NATO leadership, has taken charge of extensive provincial recon-
struction and stabilization efforts, helping set the economic, political and security
conditions for the growth of an effective, democratic national government i Afghani-
stan. As the lead member of the international coalition, the U.S. contributes troops to
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Eisentrager Court was rightly concerned that extension of the writ
might constitute "judicial interference with the military's efforts to
contain 'enemy elements [and] guerilla fighters ."..86 Though
Judge Bates noted that Bagram was "under constant threat by
suicide bombers and other violent elements" and was thus closer
to Eisentrager than Boumediene,87 he did not make the connection
made by the Eisentrager and Bournediene Courts: that extension
of the writ in such circumstances was improper judicial interfer-
ence. Merely pointing out that Bagram was under constant threat
of attack and moving on, Judge Bates failed to give adequate con-
sideration to one of the decisive differences between Eisentrager
and Boumediene, a difference which should have prevented the
extension of the writ in Maqaleh.
The Boumediene Court's discussion of the large-scale, difficult
mission American forces faced in Eisentrager was intended to
show that extension of the writ to Guantanamo was proper be-
cause American forces there faced no such mission. The Boumedi-
ene Court pointed out that, in contrast to the Eisentrager situa-
tion, Guantanamo was "a secure prison facility located on an iso-
lated and heavily fortified military base."88 Guantanamo con-
sisted of only "45 square miles of land and water" and was occu-
pied entirely by U.S. personnel, the detainees, and "a small num-
ber of workers." 89 The Boumediene Court's clear implication was
that, while American forces in Eisentrager were charged with a
massive nation-building and security mission and could not be
bothered with judicial meddling over the status of a handful of
enemy aliens, Guantanamo was a much more manageable piece of
real estate-a little place where not much was happening. Thus,
the writ could extend there without causing too much trouble.
Though Judge Bates correctly pointed out that where Maqaleh fell
along the Boumediene-Eisentrager spectrum was important,90 he
totally failed to consider that the few practical obstacles actually
mentioned by the Boumediene Court established that Maqaleh
was squarely on the Eisentrager end of that spectrum. As such,
both the ISAF mission and Operation Enduring Freedom, tasked with pursuing al-
Qaeda throughout Afghanistan's inhospitable border region with Pakistan.
Id.
86. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2261 (quoting Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 784).
87. Maqaleh, 604 F. Supp. 2d at 228.
88. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2261.
89. Id.
90. Maqaleh, 604 F. Supp. 2d at 221-22.
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those obstacles should have prevented the extension of the writ to
Afghanistan.
Judge Bates also failed to give adequate consideration to the
Boumediene Court's statement that "if the detention center were
located in an active theater of war, arguments that issuing the
writ would be 'impracticable or anomalous' would have more
weight." 91 Not recognizing that this statement was perhaps his
best guidepost in the entire Boumediene opinion, Judge Bates
dismissed it as dictum.92 It technically was dictum, and dictum is
certainly not sufficient to alter precedent to the contrary, but
Boumnediene was the only precedent for considering practical ob-
stacles to extending habeas corpus abroad. Because the statement
was dictum, and there was no other precedent on point, the issue
was one of first impression for Judge Bates. He had the choice to
either follow the on-point guidance of the Supreme Court, even
though it was dictum, or go the opposite way on his own, with no
precedential. authority to support his decision. He chose to chart
his own course and reached the unprecedented conclusion that the
writ could extend to an active war zone. While the Boumediene
Court's statement was dictum, the fact that Guantanamo was not
in an active war zone was undoubtedly a significant consideration
in its conclusion that practical obstacles would not prevent the
extension of the writ. Because the Bagram detainees did not have
this consideration in their favor, their argument that practical
obstacles should not prevent the extension of the writ was signifi-
cantly weaker.
Failing to give adequate consideration to the practical obstacles
actually discussed by the Boumediene Court, Judge Bates never-
theless took it upon himself to discuss issues that played no role in
the Boumediene Court's practical obstacles analysis. In his analy-
sis of the practical obstacles factor, Judge Bates inexplicably
brought up considerations that were relevant only to other factors.
He stated, without supporting authority, that "United States con-
trol over the detention facility is also relevant" to the practical
obstacles factor.93 However, under a proper reading of Boumedi-
ene, control over the detention facility is part of the site of deten-
91. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2261-62.
92. Maqaleh, 604 F. Supp. 2d at 230. Obiter dictum is defined as "[a] judicial comment
made while delivering a judicial opinion, but one that is unnecessary to the decision in the
case and therefore not precedential (although it may be considered persuasive)." BLAcK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 1177 (9th ed. 2009).
93. Maqaleh, 604 F. Supp. 2d at 228.
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tion factor. The only manner in which control over the detention
facility could be considered even remotely relevant to the practical
obstacles factor would be to note the Boumediene Court's reason-
ing that, while American forces in Eisentrager faced a threat of
attack, Guantanamo was isolated and secure.94 Because Judge
Bates had already conceded that Bagram was under threat of at-
tack and was thus aligned with Eisentrager in this regard, his un-
supported tangent would seem only to cut against the detainees.
However, Judge Bates's reason for finding that control over the
detention facility was relevant to the practical obstacles factor had
nothing to do with the threat of attack considered by the Boume-
diene Court, but involved consideration of yet another issue never
discussed in Boumediene. Judge Bates asserted that control over
the detention facility meant that the United States was capable of
setting up tribunals, apparently indicating that it was not imprac-
tical to extend the writ there.95 This line of reasoning, aside from
being wholly unsupported by Boumediene, was fraught with mis-
conception. First, though extensive control over a facility may, as
Judge Bates pointed out, allow for tribunals to be set up at that
facility, the habeas corpus proceedings sought by the Bagram de-
tainees would take place not at Bagram, but in courts in the
United States. Thus, the practical capability to set up a tribunal
at Bagram was irrelevant. 96 Next, Judge Bates failed to recognize
that such a consideration did not save the Eisentrager detainees.
He noted that the United States was able to provide the Eisen-
trager detainees with a "rigorous adversarial process" at a "hast-
ily-constituted military tribunal in post-war China,"97 but did not
realize that the practical capability to set up a tribunal had not
prevented the Eisentrager Court from denying the extension of the
writ. Thus, Judge Bates's use of Eisentrager to bolster his point
was misguided. His analysis of these issues might be relevant if
aimed at the adequacy of process factor, as the ability to set up
tribunals at Bagram could make the inadequate process provided
there less forgivable, but it had no place in the practical obstacles
factor. That Judge Bates discussed it there revealed that he ei-
94. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2261.
95. Maqaleh, 604 F. Supp. 2d at 228.
96. Judge Bates would later point out that video-conferencing technology would allow
Bagram detainees to be "present" at habeas proceedings in courts in the United States
(another factor never considered by the Boumediene Court in its practical obstacles analy-
sis), but the relevance of a practical capability to set up a tribunal at Bagram was never
explained. Id. at 228-29.
97. Id. at 228.
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ther did not understand the practical obstacles factor or was
grasping at straws for some semblance of an argument to prevent
that factor from killing the detainees' claims. Either way, he was
wrong.
In his analysis of the practical obstacles factor, Judge Bates's
unfounded and irrational obsession with rendition once again
reared its ugly head. Attempting to rebut the Government's ar-
gument that habeas corpus proceedings might require witnesses
to be called away from vital duties, Judge Bates noted that be-
cause the Bagram detainees were captured outside of Afghanistan
and transported there, there was no reason to believe that rele-
vant witnesses would be located in the Afghan theater of war.98
While this point may or may not be valid,99 it played no role in
Boumediene. The Boumediene Court never mentioned the avail-
ability of witnesses in its consideration of the practical obstacles
factor. Moreover, Judge Bates's reasoning would seem to apply
equally to Eisentrager, but it did not persuade the Eisentrager
Court to extend the writ. Because the Eisentrager detainees were
captured in China and transported to Germany,100 there would be
no reason to believe that relevant witnesses would be located in
Germany and have to be called away from vital duties there to
testify in courts in the United States. That the Eisentrager and
Boumediene detainees were captured elsewhere and rendered to
their place of detention was simply irrelevant in both cases.
Judge Bates's repeated attempts to give meaning to the fact that
the Bagram detainees were captured outside of Afghanistan is
extremely troubling, as it surely affected his weighing of the fac-
tors in a manner totally unsupported by precedent.
Overall, Judge Bates's analysis of the practical obstacles factor
was dismissive and evasive. Rather than squarely confronting the
practical obstacles discussed by the Boumediene Court and recog-
nizing that Maqaleh's close parallels with Eisentrager were sig-
98. Id.
99. Regardless of where the Bagram detainees were captured, one must assume that
they were captured by people whose job it is to hunt down and capture suspected terrorists.
Judge Bates thought it important that these people, not operating in Afghanistan, would
not have to be called away from a vital mission in that country to testify in habeas corpus
proceedings. However, the fact that the Bagram detainees were captured outside of Af-
ghanistan indicates the vital mission of hunting down and capturing terrorists is not con-
fined to Afghanistan. Wherever our terrorist-hunters are operating, asking them to testify
in habeas corpus proceedings would disrupt their work. Judge Bates's concern with
whether witnesses were located inside or outside of Afghanistan ignores the transnational
nature of the struggle against terrorism. The practical obstacles involved know no borders.
100. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 765-66.
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nificant, he ignored or downplayed much of what the Boumediene
Court said, choosing instead to discuss considerations that played
no part in the Boumediene Court's practical obstacles analysis.
Though he admitted that the factor was more favorable to the
Boumediene detainees than the Maqaleh detainees,' 0 ' Judge Bates
cunningly avoided reaching the conclusion that should have been
dictated by a fair reading of Boumediene: the practical obstacles
present in Maqaleh, virtually identical to those present in Eisen-
trager, should have killed the detainees' claims.102
III. CONCLUSION
While much of the blame for Maqaleh should be directed at
Judge Bates, ultimate responsibility lies with the Boumediene
Court. Its failure to properly explain how to apply and weigh the
factors of the test it invented provided the lower courts with little
guidance. Only about three of the nearly forty pages in the major-
ity opinion were devoted to the test. 03 Even with so little to go by,
it is not difficult to point out a host of mistakes Judge Bates made
in applying Boumediene. Generally, his opinion represents judi-
cial discretion gone wild. However, had the Boumediene Court
been more forthcoming, Maqaleh would never have happened. Its
poorly-reasoned, poorly-explained decision to extend the writ to
aliens detained outside the sovereign territory of the United
States opened the door to an unprecedented and potentially
101. Maqaleh, 604 F. Supp. 2d at 230. Judge Bates stated: "[The Court recognizes that
the path to providing habeas review to these petitioners is likely strewn with more practi-
cal obstacles than was the case for the detainees at Guantanamo." Id.
102. Judge Bates ultimately extended the writ to only three of the four petitioners, deny-
ing the claim of Haji Wazir, the only petitioner who was an Afghan citizen. Id. at 231.
Because Wazir was an Afghan citizen, Judge Bates stated, it was "possible-if not likely-
that review of Wazir's habeas petition by this Court could cause friction with the Afghan
government." Id. at 230. This "possibility of friction," he held, "constitut[ed] a significant
practical obstacle to habeas review." Id. at 231. While it is tempting to look favorably upon
Judge Bates's refusal to extend the writ to Wazir because it shows that he is willing to
recognize at least some limitation on his own power, his rationale exposes a perverse view
of which interests are worth protecting. Though he adopted the Boumediene Court's state-
ment about the need to defer to the Executive in military matters during wartime, id. at
208 (quoting Boumnediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2277), the only practical obstacle that Judge Bates
gave any credence was the one that touches the interests of a foreign government. While
Judge Bates ran roughshod over the Government's arguments that the military mission of
the United States would be jeopardized by his extension of the writ, he kowtowed to the
hypothetical possibility that a foreign government might be displeased. In light of his
readiness to defer to the Afghan government wherever friction is "possible" but admittedly
"not likely," Judge Bates's steadfast refusal to defer to our own Executive during wartime-
despite his lip service to the contrary-is even more appalling.
103. Boumnediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2259-62.
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boundless expansion of habeas corpus jurisdiction. Eschewing
time-tested, bright-line rules for a nebulous, wishy-washy balanc-
ing test, the Boitmediene Court no doubt thought it was embracing
nuance and complexity. But what it was really doing was destroy-
ing predictability and giving federal judges a far too expansive
discretion to decide sensitive national security questions.
On June 1, 2009, the Maqaleh decision was certified for inter-
locutory appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Dis-
trict of Columbia Circuit.' 04 The D.C. Circuit should reverse
Judge Bates's decision and overrule his clumsy expansion of
Boumediene. Boumediene itself was a striking example of judicial
overreaching. Any decision to reach even farther and expand
Boumediene should, at the very least, be left to the Supreme
Court.
James Thornburg
104. Al Maqaleh v. Gates, 620 F. Supp. 2d 51 (2009) (granting motion to certify for ap-
peal).
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